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The Inadequacy of Forrester System Dynamics
Computer Programs for Institutional Principles
of Hierarchy, Feedback, and Openness
F. Gregory Hayden
The purpose here is to discuss the institutional systems principles of hierarchy, feedback,
and openness, and to explain the inadequacy of Forrester-type system dynamics programs
to apply those principles.
Hierarchy
It is the function of some system components to control what happenings are to
happen, and to determine where, when, how, and to what extent they are to happen.
Hierarchies exist to ensure that the happenings are happening as they should happen.
The various system components that form the more powerful level in a structural hierar-
chy exert specific directives on the activities and deliveries of other components through
a variety of forms that establish different kinds of control paths among institutional
organizations.
Hierarchies contain many different kinds of criteria, rules, controls, regulations,
and so forth. Technology is an example of system controls, as it provides criteria that
must be met in a social system. Rules, regulations, and requirements are established in
particular social settings to establish controls and sanctions necessary to meet normative
criteria. Karl Polanyi used the concepts of permission, obligation, and prohibition to
categorize criteria and control sets. John Commons clarified that system action, which
includes exchange transactions, used the auxiliary verbs can, cannot, must, must not, may
or may not do in order to categorize collective sanctions.
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Figure 1 was presented by Robert Boyer as a summary of the “new institutional eco-
nomics” concept of rules for the hierarchical relationships among the entries contained
in the figure, about which he stated that the definitions indicate “a clear hierarchy”
(2001, 85–89). Boyer’s statement that the relationships among the entities in figure 1
are “Top-down: From the constitution to individuals: a clear hierarchy” (88) is an
attempt to make hierarchy into a spatial order, rather than an institutional process, and
to confirm a hierarchical concept by the placement of geometric figures on a page. Hier-
archy is not a matter of the spatial concept of up and down, and figure 1 is not a clear
top-down hierarchy. The order and placement of the figures could be changed and not
change the meaning.
Figure 1 is a very misleading rendition of complex systems. The process of constitu-
tionality and rulemaking is not a linear order connected with pluses and minuses. Con-
stitutional order is an expression of a complex network that is established, renewed, and
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Figure 1. Relationships among Constitutional Order, Institutions, Organizations,
and Conventions
Source: Boyer 2001.
processed through institutions. Furthermore, institutions are guided by cultural values
and normative criteria (see Hayden 1998), which are absent from figure 1. To have regu-
lative power, constitutional activity has to be established in the various institutional
organizations that are part of complex systems. Constitutional order is not an entity sep-
arate from institutions. In reality, constitutionality is expressed as a set of processes,
flows, and deliveries within and among institutional organizations.
Furthermore, figure 1 is misleading because it has rulemaking in the top part of the
figure but not the lower. First, the formulation of rules is spread throughout the
socioecological matrix, and rules are constructed to be consistent with a whole array of
normative criteria. For example, if a rule is established in bridge building that there is to
be a three-inch weld every twelve inches, that rule has been established in response to
criteria for concerns such as safety, monetary cost, wind conditions, and so forth. Sec-
ond, “informal habits and ideology are expected to play a role in constitutional change
as well as feedback from the performance of existing everyday-level institutions”
(Schmid 2004, 3). Third, institutions that make rules must also use rules for making
rules that come from other institutions, and “the rules for changing rules affect how
everyday rules might be changed.”
The institutions that make up constitutional processes are working institutions and
not an entity positioned on high as depicted in figure 1. Constitutional processes are
part of a socioecological network; constitutional rulings can come from many different
kinds of institutions and organizations, and their rulings change with new interpreta-
tions directed by other institutions, for example, political institutions. Constitutional
decisions in institutions operate according to the complex system surrounding the
institutions.
Deliveries among institutions and organizations are not a matter of simple pluses
and minuses, as indicated in figure 1. The deliveries from court rulings, for example, are
delivered by other institutions, such as police departments delivering arrests, schools
delivering instruction, and pharmacies delivering methods of birth control—hardly plus
and minus categories. Are rules that increase monetary costs for corporations consid-
ered minuses because corporations try to avoid them? It is through such costs that most
beneficial flows are provided—incomes, environmental protection, product safety, can-
cer prevention, and so forth. So would such rules get a plus or a minus? One set of collec-
tive rules establishes accounting principles that require accountants to designate
payments to labor as a cost, while economic development laws and rules require accoun-
tants to designate the same payments to labor as a positive benefit.
Control Paths: Feedback and Feedforward
A system as a processing unit has no forward or backward; lots of befores and after-
wards regularly repeat themselves, so that some afterwards come before the next cycle of
befores. Thus, it makes as much sense to talk about feedforwards as feedbacks in a com-
Inadequacy of Forrester System Dynamics Programs for Institutional Principles 529
plex system. Feedback is a form of inter- and intra-systemic control in which the perfor-
mance of the system utilizes information, requirements, materials, violence, criteria,
rules, evaluation research, inventories, semiotic signs, money flows, and other deliveries
to guide a system. Hierarchy is one reason for feedback.
Negative feedback processes are error activated and goal seeking in that the goal
state is compared with the actual deliveries and deviations in order to direct the system
toward the goal state. “Negative feedback, thus, leads to the convergence of system
behavior toward some goal” (Hayden 2006, 58). Positive feedback processes, in which
positive feedback overwhelms negative feedback, tend to be destructive to the system
because a change in the original level of the system provides an input for further change
in the same direction.
The feedback concept comes from cybernetics, where feedback means devices in a
mechanical system to counter entropy. The conservation process for energy also con-
serves information, and, as a consequence, information became the main concern of
cybernetics. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, recommended caution in try-
ing to apply the feedback concept in cybernetics to the social sciences (Gjessling 1968,
11). Cybernetics is mechanistic, based on physics, and very concerned with
energetics—hardly the base for studying feedback control in social systems. Social sys-
tems are much too open, irregular, and dynamic for a mechanistic theory to apply. Con-
trary to Wiener’s warning, feedback has usually been implemented in social science
models as a simple one-dimensional information construct, as expressed by the
bottom-up arrows in figure 1.
In contrast to figure 1, the network in figure 2 demonstrates the complexity and
extensiveness of constitutional order, hierarchy, and control paths. Figure 2 is a digraph
expression of part of a social fabric matrix for the management of the surface water of
the Platte River in Nebraska (USA) (Yang 1996, 237–256). The parentheses on the
edges indicate delivery cells in the social fabric matrix (238). The system requires water
users to obtain water-use rights through an application process. Figure 2 is the applica-
tion process among organizations to obtain the water-use rights. Application processes
are among the most important activities of rulemaking.
Figure 2 clarifies that (1) the whole system must function together in order for it to
be effective; (2) the ecological systems and institutional systems are integrated and sus-
tain each other; (3) the process is not confined to top-down relationships; (4) institu-
tional connectivity is crucial to constitutionality, control, and regulation; and (5)
feedback control paths in a social system are sets of institutional processes at work.
Examples of application activities include:
• Edge (8,18): The Water Management Board sends a notice of rejection or
acceptance, along with policy criteria and 75 percent of the project cost if
approved, in response to an application for a water-use project from Instream
Water Users I (1. Game and Parks Commission).
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• Edge (7,17): Reflects the requirements of Natural Resource Districts for
Municipal Water Users as part of the Natural Resource Districts’ control over
groundwater use.
• Edge (6,19): In response to instream appropriation applications from Instream
Water Users II, the Nebraska Department of Water Resources delivers, if
approved, the notice of acceptance of projects for recreation or fish and wildlife
purposes.
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Figure 2. Relationships among Regulatory Organizations and Water Users’
Organizations in the Application Process for Water Use
Source: Yang 1996.
• Edges (18,12), (19,12) and (13,12): To keep the system processing, conflicts must
be delivered to the appropriate agencies for resolution. These three edges indicate
deliveries as a result of conflicts among the Game and Parks Commission,
Instream Water Users II (Natural Resource Districts), and Water Developers.
The conflicts are delivered to the Nebraska Supreme Court for adjudication.
These examples clarify that for constitutional order and control paths to function, a net-
work of deliveries must be processing.
Openness
Openness is a characteristic of all systems and therefore needs to be recognized in
institutional modeling. Openness means that there is a diverse environment surrounding
any system and that there are continuous flows of energy, information, materials, and
ideas from the environment to the system and from the system to the environment. The
system is defined in detail, but the external environment is not, because the only interest
in the environment is how it impacts on the system. Because real-world systems are con-
stantly open to their environments, equilibrium is not possible.
Openness was discovered and articulated first in the physical and biological sci-
ences; thus, scholars and policy makers often do not recognize that social systems are
much more open and dynamic than traditional systems literature indicates. First, “part
of an organization is the behavior of other organizations” (Schmid 2004, 262), includ-
ing other organizations in the environment. Second, extreme diversity exists in the envi-
ronment surrounding any social or economic system. Third, myriad optional and
contingent components can begin functioning in the environment, opening the system
to new influences. Fourth, environments evolve through differentiation and elabora-
tion. Fifth, the social world surrounding a system changes because it establishes institu-
tions for enhancing change: courts, for example. Sixth, environments change because
technology continues to differentiate.
The rendition of system organizations in figure 1 allows for change to be imple-
mented only from changes within the system. There is no environment indicated and,
thus, no openness. The same incorrect assumption is made for Forrester-type system
dynamics computer programs.
Forrester System Dynamics Computer Programs
The computer programs for Forrester system dynamics computer programs are
inadequate for expressing the characteristics of hierarchy, feedback, and openness as
understood in institutional economics (OIE) because of the unique conceptualizations
in the Forrester tradition.
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Jay Forrester developed his analysis for electrical engineering systems and applied
it, along with the positive and negative charges of electricity, to social science problems,
as in figure 3. Thus, the main problem with Forrester-type computer programs is the
focus on the pluses and minuses of closed electrical programs, while the basic building
blocks of the social sciences are institutions, normative criteria, rules, and so forth (see
Parto 2005).
Mimicry Is Not Modeling
Forrester systems literature emphasizes that models are to mimic databases, mean-
ing that coefficients are to be adjusted with the capabilities of the computer program
until the model will reproduce historical database results for particular entities of inter-
est. “Employing systems dynamics involves specifying the mathematical relationships
among the various objects deemed to be parts of the system under study and then mak-
ing adjustments to the parameters until historical inputs generate historical outputs”
(Harvey and Klopfenstein 2001, 441–442). If the goal is to juggle data and manipulate
coefficients until a particular historical data path is reproduced, what the nodes in the
model are called or how they work in the real world is not a concern. It is coefficient
adjustments that generate validity. The coefficients are not adjusted because of statisti-
cal analysis or institutional theory but, rather, to reproduce a database.
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Figure 3. Influence Diagram of Patterns of Interactions in Hog Production
Environmental Regulation in Quebec
Source: Thomassin and Cloutier 2004.
Plus and Minus Adjustments as Substitutes for Theory
and Observed Relationships
Within most Forrester dynamics programs, there is the capability to attach any two
entities in a program mapping and “tweak” the real or imagined connections with plus
or minus charges to indicate influence, or support, or opposition, or causes, or what-
ever. Plus and minus charges are utilized to create a mapping that results from feedback
loops that influence the activity nodes. “Following established syntax, the ‘+’ and ‘-’
signs on the diagram denote ‘supporting’ and ‘opposing’ influences, or causes, respec-
tively. These influences form closed loops that represent either reinforcing or balancing
feedback structures within the system. The interaction of these feedback loops, and at
times the domination of the process by any of the loops, causes pressures, instability,
and dynamic behavior of the system over time” (Thomassin and Cloutier 2004, 499).
With regard to figure 3, Paul Thomassin and Martin Cloutier stated, “The influence
diagram is meant to illustrate the policy, organizational, and operational pressures asso-
ciated with the conflict of interest in hog production with the public” (498). So what are
the details in figure 3? What is the positive charge that “land” gives the “Public?” What
does the “Public” mean? Is it a court, agency, or legislative body, or is it what John Dewey
defined as the public? Where are the normative criteria that guide the socioecological
process? It may not matter, because the authors state that the purpose is to estimate
“potential outcome” and “imagined situations” (498).
Plus and Minus Approach to Modeling
The plus and minus approach to modeling social problems should not be substi-
tuted for social systems theory and observed relationships for numerous reasons.
First, changing pluses and minuses to obtain databases that preceded the model
does not provide analysts with modeling to determine whether the databases correctly
reflect the system.
Second, the Forrester definition of dynamics is inconsistent with that found in gen-
eral systems theory. For Forrester, dynamics is a result of predetermined feedback loops
that must be defined within the system. As explained above, dynamics is the result of the
relationships between the system and the undefined activity in the surrounding envi-
ronment. Forrester programs exclude openness. Instead, the Forrester approach is to
force the construction of feedback loops within system boundaries in order to create
behavior. This is contrary to the institutional approach, in which interest is in the obser-
vation and modeling of real-world behavior that includes system openness to
surrounding environments.
Third, Forrester dynamics experts claim that level and rate variables are sufficient
elements for defining a system. However, a rate is just a mathematical expression, calcu-
lated from levels. In reality, levels are flow deliveries among institutions and between
institutions and ecological systems. The delivery levels are guided by other institutions
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that regulate, monitor, and enforce according to normative criteria—not pluses,
minuses, and rates. The latter are inadequate to explain or understand a social system.
Normative criteria, rules, regulations, and requirements guide the level-to-level relation-
ships in the real-world sociological systems, not mathematical artifacts.
Conclusion
In institutional economics, the concepts of hierarchy, feedback, and openness are
consistent with (1) general systems analysis, (2) the treatment of hierarchy and feedback
as part of complex system networks, and (3) system dynamics that result from a system
being open to its environment. Thus, it is inappropriate to adopt the definitions of
these concepts as they are defined in “new institutional economics” and inadequate to
utilize Forester-type computer programs to apply them for analysis of real-world systems.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the real-world hierarchical systems that provide for constitu-
tionality, rulemaking, and control are the consequence of integrated organizations that
are sustained through a network of system criteria and deliveries. A constant set of nor-
mative criteria in a stable system can lead to requirements for diverse kinds, different
distributions, varying quantities, and either increases or decreases of delivery levels
among the same organizations given different situations. Thus, the simple idea of mod-
eling relationships among organizations and between systems and the environment like
plus and minus electrical charges as required by Forester-type computer programs is
inconsistent with institutional economics.
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